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Executive Summary
After three years and a costly war, which recently destroyed the great 
al-Nouri mosque in Mosul, the military defeat of the self-proclaimed 
Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq is imminent. The Mosul offensive is a test 
case for both Iraq and for the international coalition; if it succeeds, it 
could be used as a model to be applied elsewhere in the region, such 
as in Raqqa. If it fails to create stability in Nineveh and Iraq, a new 
radical group may emerge, with far-reaching consequences. 
There are at least four essential reasons for concern. The first is the 
lack of a real Iraqi and regional coalition against ISIS. The reluctance 
of regional actors to work together against ISIS makes the ideological 
battle against it difficult. Governments in the Middle East do not 
consider ISIS their prime enemy; for instance, for Turks, the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), and not ISIS, is the main terrorist group. The 
Saudi-Iran rivalry takes priority over the regional battle against ISIS 
and fuels sectarianisation and extremism in both camps.
Second, the Iraqi army is still in disarray and, overall the security 
sector is characterised by a duality that not only reduces combat 
effectiveness but also fuels Sunni grievances. Western states’ support 
for Iraq’s security sector has been centered on the elite Counter-
Terrorism Forces and Special Operations Forces. Shia militias stand 
accused of severe human rights abuses and sectarian practices against 
civilians; impunity still exists and the legal status of the Popular 
Mobilisation Forces (PMF) is still unclear. 
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Third, strong Sunni grievances still exist; most Arab 
Sunnis are alienated from the state. The Iraqi government 
and security sector are still dominated by Shias. Although 
the passing of power from Nouri al-Maliki to Haidar 
al-Abadi had some symbolic weight, there is still little 
power-sharing. This propels mainstream Sunnis into 
spoilers of a potential peace. 
Fourth, the internal leadership crisis among Sunni Arabs 
makes it difficult to formulate governance alternatives. 
Sunni leaders in Iraq are currently faced with an 
extraordinary opportunity because of the decline of 
ISIS’ popularity, but are not exploiting it. The extreme 
fragmentation of Sunni Arab leadership goes beyond 
societal, tribal and regional cleavages. If divisions are 
only an expression of regionalism, the intense in-fighting 
between leaders from the same cities, such as Mosul, 
stand unexplained. Sectarianism weakens Sunnis in the 
long run, propelling radicals, like Jihadis, to become 
spokespersons for Sunnis. 
The lack of a political plan for post-ISIS governance 
in the Nineveh province is of great concern, since the 
impending defeat of the group in Mosul will not mean an 
end to Jihadism as an ideology. The root causes that led 
to the rise of ISIS must be addressed immediately. There 
is currently an opportunity to re-establish the bases of 
the Iraqi state, and Iraqi nationalism, in remote and/
or deprived areas, should be exploited further by local, 
federal and international stakeholders. Sunni leaders 
from Mosul must put petty conflicts aside, and the donor 
community should expand partnerships with a variety of 
local and regional stakeholders. Youths in Nineveh must 
be given job opportunities, to avoid poor governance and 
a power vacuum in the wake of the liberation giving rise 
to new radicalisms. Moreover, the question concerning 
decentralisation, and possibly, the creation of new federal 
regions, on the model of the Kurdish one, should be 
discussed.
Full Report
After three years and a costly war, the military defeat 
of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq is 
imminent. The Mosul offensive is a test case for both 
Iraq and for the international coalition; if it succeeds, it 
could be used as a model to be applied elsewhere in the 
region, such as in Raqqa. If it fails to create stability in 
Nineveh and Iraq, a new radical group may emerge, with 
far-reaching consequences. 
There are at least four essential reasons for concern. 
The first  is the lack of a real Iraqi and regional coalition 
against ISIS. The reluctance of regional actors to work 
together against ISIS makes the ideological battle against 
it difficult. Second, the Iraqi army is still in disarray and, 
overall, the security sector is characterised by a duality 
that not only reduces combat effectiveness but also fuels 
Sunni grievances. Third, the existence of strong Sunni 
grievances propels mainstream Sunnis into spoilers of a 
potential peace, unless alternatives are found. Fourth, the 
crisis of representation of Sunni Arabs makes it difficult 
to formulate credible and more legitimate governance 
alternatives to the status quo. Two potential tipping 
points exist: the reform plan of present Prime Minister 
Haydar al-Abadi and the potential positive role of the 
international community in forcing through reforms 
in Iraq. Yet, so far, results have been mixed, providing 
additional reasons to be pessimistic for Iraq’s future.
No Real Coalition Against Isis; and 
Fighting it is not a Regional Priority
Nothing has been simple in the preparation of the 
Mosul campaign. The ground offensive is led jointly by 
Iraqi troops and the Kurdish peshmerga forces, with air 
support from the international coalition. In addition, a 
total of 100-150,000 Shia, Christians, Yazidi and Sunni 
volunteers are gathered together and participate under 
different slogans and under the umbrella name Popular 
Mobilisation Forces (PMF) (O’Dryscoll and van Zoonen 
2017:9). At best, there are several separate battles 
on-going, a limited day-to-day coordination between 
actors who are more afraid of each other than of ISIS.
There exist some minimum criteria to be met before we 
can use the word ‘coalition’ (Henke, 2017); at the very least 
that the actors must share the same enemy. The opposite 
is true for the various actors involved in defeating ISIS in 
Mosul. Only the United States and the European states in 
the international coalition actually see ISIS as the biggest 
challenge in the region. US military advisors returned 
to Iraq in 2014, as part of the International Coalition 
against ISIS. More than 5,000 are deployed, and a 
1.2 billion USD train and equip program has been 
disbursed. Other countries in the International Coalition 
have also helped train Iraq’s security forces since 2014; 
the Italian carabinieri have been in the forefront of 
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training the Iraqi security forces. Yet, most effort has 
been centered on the elite Counter-Terrorism Forces and 
Special Operations Forces, with the regular Iraqi army 
still in disarray. Many countries in the International 
Coalition have, following US pressure, sent their special 
forces to Erbil to train Kurdish peshmerga, but not all are 
involved with the Iraqi federal level in Baghdad.
While the wish to respond to US pressure has also 
motivated West European states, local and regional 
actors have other priorities in addition to fighting ISIS. 
Governments in the Middle East do not consider ISIS 
their prime enemy; for instance, for Turks, the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), and not ISIS, is the main terrorist 
group. Turkey has intervened militarily in Iraq (with 
around 850 soldiers) in order to play a role in regional 
diplomacy, but its military presence is contested by 
Baghdad. For Saudi Arabia,2 Iran, and its allied Iraqi Shia 
militias, are worse than ISIS. For Iran and the extremely 
powerful Iraqi Shia militias loyal to Tehran, such as the 
Badr Brigades and Asaib Ahl al-Haqq, the enemy is more 
extensive than only ISIS, it also includes other Sunni 
groups.
Mosul is the first battle to be waged jointly by the Kurdish 
peshmerga and the Iraqi army. Yet, they have approached 
Mosul from different directions: the Kurdish (Kurdistan 
Democratic Party, KDP) peshmerga from the east and the 
Iraqi security forces and Shia militias from the Popular 
Mobilisation Forces from the southwest. Moreover, 
Kurdish peshmerga and security forces in Baghdad 
have different motivations, although all of these seem 
to be sub-state impulses. Iraqi Kurds, loyal to Erbil and 
Suleimania, are investing their military contributions 
into the project to create an independent Kurdish state. 
The rise of ISIS since 2014 has given Iraqi Kurds what 
they see as a ‘historical opportunity’ for independence. 
Baghdad accepted the provision of weapons to the 
Kurdish peshmerga by both NATO and Russia because 
it needs Kurdish help against ISIS. Masoud Barzani, 
president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
has warned the international community and Baghdad 
that the KRG is planning a non-binding referendum on 
independence on 25 September this year,3 and he has 
2. Saudi Arabia is part of the international coalition against 
ISIS, but only in Syria, not in Iraq. The monarchy’s limited 
influence in Iraq is mainly confined to religious actors, 
and its impact is especially low in the Sunni Arab north, 
close to Turkey.
3. ‘Kurdistan region to hold independence referendum 
expressed willingness that it is overseen by the UN.4 
This would have granted more international legitimacy, 
but international actors are unlikely to accept such a 
concession towards Kurdish statehood because of Turkey. 
Like in Syria, Kurdish peshmerga have used the occasion 
of the war against ISIS to seize disputed territories, 
including Kirkuk and Sinjar. The future might see a clash 
not only between Sunnis and Shia and Sunni Arabs and 
Kurds, but also between Shia and Kurds over the division 
of spoils from Mosul. 
The Duality of Iraq’s Security Sector
Iraq is today in dire need of security sector reform. 
Despite Western material support and capacity building, 
including the US train and equip program, which 
was mentioned above, progress in reforming security 
institutions has been extremely slow. US policy has 
thus far been to circumvent the Iraqi army and Defence 
Ministry by working with elite forces. Yet, this can be 
only a short-term strategy, complemented by bringing 
political pressure to bear on Baghdad.
The Iraqi army was long the bearer of Iraq’s national 
identity; the institution was also politicised and shaped 
by Saddam Hussein’s repressive regime, with extensive 
patrimonial practices (Parisiliti & Antoon 2000; see also 
Marashi & Salama 2008). In 2003, the US occupation 
authorities disbanded the Baathist army, removing the 
livelihood of hundreds of thousands of officers and 
soldiers. The Iraqi army created by the US forces has long 
been known for its weakness and corruption; many top-
rank officers were promoted thanks to personal bonds 
of loyalty to the former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki. 
It was known as a “check-point army”, because it was fit 
only for stopping civilians at check-points, sometimes 
arbitrarily (Luizard 2015: 17), but had little combat 
effectiveness, despite the more than 25 billion USD 
provided by Washington since 2003. The total collapse of 
the army’s two divisions stationed in Mosul in June 2014, 
on 25 Sept’, Rudaw, 7 June 2017. http://www.rudaw.net/
english/kurdistan/070620171 (accessed June 2017). For an 
analysis, see ‘Independence referendum bolsters Kurdish 
position before Iraqi elections’, Rudaw, 2 May 2017. http://
www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/02052017 Accessed May 
2017.
4.  ‘UN agrees to oversee Kurdistan independence referendum 
[sic.]: Offical’ http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-
politics/un-agrees-oversee-kurdistan-independence-
referendum-official/ (1 April 2017)
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in the face of a few thousand Jihadis, was nonetheless 
unexpected. 
The army’s inability to protect Iraqis led the grand Shia 
cleric Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to issue a fatwa calling 
for the mobilisation of volunteers to fight ISIS. This 
was the backdrop leading to the creation of the PMF. 
The inefficiencies, and poor reputation, of the Iraqi 
army is also why Iraqi youths generally prefer to join a 
group within the PMF rather than the army. The PMF 
was recognised as an integral part of the Iraqi state in 
December 2016; yet despite this, no statutes exist to 
rationalise its functioning or its operational autonomy. 
The different groups within the PMF still function as 
independent militias with competing sub-state political 
agendas (O’Driscoll and van Zoonen 2017). Some of 
the groups, such as the Badr Brigades and Kataib Ahl 
al-Haqq, also fight in Syria alongside Bashar al-Assad’s 
regime. They stand accused of severe human rights abuses 
and sectarian practices against civilians (Amnesty 2016; 
Amnesty 2014). Some army divisions, such as the Army’s 
fifth division in East Diyala, are allegedly under the 
control of the Badr Brigades (Newsweek 2016). Recently, 
in the Mosul campaign, some army brigades have fought 
under Shia sectarian banners and the name of Hussein 
(Twitter 2016-7). 
The potential for reform of Iraq’s dual security system is 
a controversial topic of prime concern to the future of 
Iraq, for several reasons (see for instance, O’Dryscoll and 
van Zoonen 2017:9; Sayigh 2015). To operate throughout 
Iraqi territory, let alone fight terrorism, the army needs 
not only material supplies (to replace the equipment 
seized by ISIS) but also an improved relationship with 
Iraqi civilians. The very reason ISIS was able to take over 
Mosul was not only the support of ISIS from among the 
Maslawi population, but the army’s inefficiencies and 
lack of legitimacy. Since the army hails almost exclusively 
from southern Iraq, and is seen as having a Shia religious 
bias, it considers itself in enemy territory when in Sunni 
areas.5 In the fight against terrorism, the army is unable 
to distinguish civilians from enemy combatants. This 
reduces army combat efficiency, and makes the army 
prone to avoid battles in Sunni areas. 
Obviously, there should also be a strong political incentive 
for reform of Iraq’s security sector. The deficiencies in this 
sector, and the extensive impunity which emerged as a 
5.  I am grateful to Dr. Yehia al-Kubeisi for this analysis.
result, feeds into the existing grievances of many Sunni 
Arabs. 
The Grievances of Sunni Arabs
The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, following the 
US-led invasion and occupation, and the subsequent 
debaathification process and disintegration of the 
Iraqi army, left a void in Iraq. The security situation 
deteriorated, as Sunni and Shia armed groups first fought 
the occupation and, in 2006 and 2007, opposed each 
other in a sectarian war. The US withdrew its last troops 
from Iraq in 2011, following difficulties in the renewal of 
its mandate and a more stabilised situation following the 
US surge (2007-8). 
During his second mandate (November 2010-September 
2014), Nouri al-Maliki’s regime became more reliant 
on Shia forces (rather than forces from different sects), 
and corruption escalated. After the US withdrawal, the 
executive had taken control of the independent agencies 
created by the occupation authorities, including the 
Central Bank, and it undermined the power of the 
parliament (Dodge 2013: 248). Key political Sunni 
figures, including the then Vice-President (VP), the 
Deputy Prime Minister and the Finance Minister, were 
placed under house arrest on disputed terrorism charges. 
The VP was convicted of murder and sentenced to death 
in absentia but fled to Qatar via the Kurdistan region. The 
waves of arrests of prominent Sunni politicians, repeated 
in December 2012 and December 2013, deepened 
sectarian tension in Iraq; the arrests were followed by 
popular demonstrations in Sunni tribal areas. Added to 
this, another grievance among tribal Sunnis in al-Anbar 
province was their marginalisation following the US 
withdrawal. 
A central dimension of the US surge was the establishment 
and arming of Sunni tribal ‘Awakening’ forces 
(al-Sahawat), in al-Anbar province, to fight al-Qaeda. 
Although many tribal fighters and leaders were motivated 
by economic incentives, this proved a way to bring Arab 
Sunnis in Iraq back into the state, providing them with a 
livelihood. The former leader of the Awakening Council 
in al-Anbar province, Abdoul Satar Abou Risha was 
assassinated by the Jihadis in 2007. Yet despite this, the 
Council was very successful in re-establishing security: 
within a year, the level of violence in Iraq was more than 
halved, from 260,000 dead in 2007 to 120,000 in 2008 (Iraq 
Body Count 2017). The model of al-Anbar was re-created 
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elsewhere, reaching a total force of around 65,000 men 
(Wehrey & Ahram 2015). The tribal forces had been 
promised integration in the medium term within the 
Iraqi state and security apparatus, through the creation of 
an Iraqi National Guard. However, this never happened; 
in 2010, the Americans transferred the authority over the 
Awakening Councils to al-Maliki’s government, which 
immediately disarmed many of them. Men in al-Anbar 
saw this as a ‘betrayal’ by the Americans, though it seems 
(lack of statistics notwithstanding) that the number of 
Awakening Council fighters who pledged loyalty to ISIS 
has been very limited. 
Jihadism had been weakened in Iraq by 2010 (Tønnessen 
2015), but was strengthened again in 2012 because of 
the violent spill-over from Syria and the ability of Jihadi 
operatives to take advantage of discontent among Sunni 
tribes and men of religion. ISIS created temporary 
compliance among former Baathists, and allied Sufi 
Naqsbandiya groups. These, and other Sunnis in tribal 
areas, felt they had little to lose and, against the backdrop 
of a lack of alternatives, made the decision to support ISIS. 
In 2014, the Jihadi group was able to take over one third 
of Iraq, mainly in the northwest, and including Mosul, 
Iraq’s second largest city and the heart of Sunni Islam 
in Iraq. Sunni tribes and Islamist groups in the country 
found no other alternative representation, and this paved 
the way for the emergence of ISIS in Iraq. 
Following a period during which the Iraqi government 
leaned increasingly on Shia groups, and Sunnis were 
increasingly excluded from power sharing, many Iraqi 
Sunni Arabs gambled on ISIS statehood. This came as 
a reaction to the growing power and impunity of Shia 
militias, which made some Sunnis think that ISIS would 
be the better, and only available option, to the status 
quo. The weakness and corruption of mainstream Sunni 
leaders were other reasons for their choice.
Internal Sunni Crisis and Wasted 
Opportunities
With the decline in popularity of ISIS, Sunni leaders in Iraq 
are currently faced with an extraordinary opportunity. 
Yet, few credible alternatives have been put on the table, 
neither by Sunni leaders nor by Iraqi politicians at large. 
Extreme fragmentation means that Sunni leaders are 
passive and do not respond effectively to the challenges 
and opportunities of the present . 
To take the fragmentation first: ‘Sunni Arabs’ is a category 
that emerged formally in July 2003 from the Governing 
Council constituted by the US-led occupation authority, 
in which, for the first time in Iraq’s history, the country’s 
ethnic and religious groups were represented according 
to demographic size: Sunnis obtained 5 out of 25 seats.6 
Before 2003, Arabs considered themselves part of two 
majority groups in the Middle East: as Arabs (majority in 
Iraq) and Sunnis (around 40% in Iraq but a majority in the 
wider Middle East). Never had they thought of themselves 
as constituting a minority group of demographically only 
around 18%. The wish to ally, and merge, with other 
groups (non-Sunni Arabs and non-Arab Sunnis) explains 
why, prior to 2003, the political opposition of Iraqis from 
Sunni Arab families was rarely expressed in communal 
terms. One exception was the Iraqi Sunni Islamist parties. 
Arab Sunnis did not consider themselves a ‘community’ 
but saw themselves as true bearers of the Iraqi state, and 
were treated as Statsvolk in their interactions with the 
state (Haddad 2017: 118). Arab nationalism was, and still 
is, often accredited to the Sunni Muslim community and 
associated with the history of Sunni Islam. Moreover, 
Sunnis were sometimes accused by Shia and Kurds to 
be pro-Saddam. The majority of Iraqi army officers were 
Sunni, including many high-ranking officers from Mosul. 
Conversely, although Shia in the Iraqi army fought Iran 
between 1980-1988, Iraqi Shia were often accused of 
being un-patriotic and loyal to Iran.
Saddam Hussein was weakened politically following the 
crack-down of both a Shia and a Kurdish popular uprising 
in 1991, and because of the subsequent international 
sanctions regime. To survive politically, he then gave 
power to Sunni tribes, re-inventing a tribal ethos that 
had been lost during socio-political modernisation in 
the 20th century (Baram 1997: 15). A ‘faith’ campaign to 
re-Islamise society and introduce religion into the Baath 
party, was also initiated (al-Rashid 2010: 489). Yet, this 
did not mean that the regime turned more ‘Sunni’; since 
it was by that time narrower and more personalised and 
predatory than it had ever been. Moreover, localisms and 
personal power struggles had taken over from ideology 
within the Baath party.
Arab Sunni populations in Iraq were and still are 
extremely diverse. There is strong regionalism and 
local patriotism, in Mosul, for instance. With its proud 
6. 13 seats were given to Shia, five to Sunnis, five to Kurds, 
one to Turkmen and one to Assyrians
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Ottoman and 20th-century history, as a city of trade, 
industry and science, it considers itself superior to other 
Iraqi Arab Sunni regions. Following 2003, the leadership 
of al-Anbar in the resistance against the US-led 
occupation was recognised by many Iraqi Arab Sunnis 
elsewhere. In Mosul, however, the population disdained 
al-Anbar and saw it as a region that was too tribal, too 
primitive and not urbanised enough to have the right to 
speak in their name. Yet, nor were Maslawis able to come 
up with an alternative, because of their divisions: while 
some are close to the political line in Baghdad, others 
look to Ankara. 
Today, Baathism and Islamism constitute the two largest 
political currents among Sunni Arabs in Iraq, but neither 
offers a viable alternative and a vision for the future 
(Mansour 2016: 15). The Iraqi Islamic Party (the Iraqi 
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) has been discredited 
for its participation in the political process and its failure 
to improve conditions for its constituencies. Actors who 
still identify with the Baath party, and its refusal of the 
fait accompli, are in exile in Jordan, and more and more 
out of touch with the population. Ideologically, there is an 
enormous void. Sunni political movements and alliances 
such as al-Mutahidun do not have a cause with which 
they can rally the constituency, and often end up locked 
in destructive power struggles.7 At best, the only shared 
project is the negative one against competing ethnic-
sectarian groups; but opposition to political Shiism is 
insufficient to create a political public, and sectarianism 
weakens Sunnis in the long run, propelling to the fore 
radicals, including Jihadis, as spokespersons for Sunnis 
(Gade 2015, Rougier 2015). 
The Prime Minister’s Reform Agenda
After the Iraqi 2014 parliamentary elections, international 
(in addition to domestic and Shia clerical) pressures were 
crucial in forcing the resignation of former Prime Minister 
Nouri al-Maliki from power. Although al-Maliki’s 
State of Law bloc had the largest number of shares in 
parliament, it did not have a majority. This created fears 
of a constitutional crisis, against the backdrop of huge 
security challenges. Western powers believed that the 
exclusivist regime al-Maliki had created in his second 
7.  See, for instance: ‘Iraqi officials to arrest former governor 
if he re-enters Mosul’, Rudaw, 28 January 2017, http://www.
rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/280120174 (accessed 
January 2017).
mandate was responsible for creating conditions that led 
to the rise of ISIS. 
An engineer with a Phd from the UK, Haydar al-Abadi was 
found as a compromise candidate. He sought to represent a 
more secular and Iraqi nationalist wing in the Shia Islamist 
Dawa party, against the ‘Malikioun’, supporters of al-Maliki, 
a cleric who had spent a decade in exile in Iran in the 
1980s. Al-Abadi expressed a willingness to reform the Iraqi 
state, towards more accountability and inclusion towards 
Sunnis, and to recreate an Iraqi army after its collapse in 
Mosul. There were few credible alternatives to this, since 
the Iraqi nationalist al-Iraqiyya bloc, which had regrouped 
most Sunni politicians until then under the leadership of 
Iyad al-Alawi, had scattered following its inability to form 
a government in 2010 (Dawod 2014: 73). 
Abadi’s reform program was presented in August 2015, 
a year after he took office. The seven-point program 
included decentralisation, anti-corruption measures 
and rationalisation of the budget and of administrative 
appointments. The reforms also included a proposal to 
cut salaries of state officials and remove the three deputy 
prime minister and three vice presidential (VP) posts, 
including that of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. 
The shift of power was symbolically important, and made 
some parts of the opposition more inclined to make a 
compromise, including the Revolutionary Council of 
Tribes from al-Anbar, which had earlier supported ISIS. 
Yet, Abadi’s reform efforts have so far produced limited 
results (Mansour 2016), and have been obstructed by 
allies of former PM Nouri al-Maliki. These are still are 
numerous, even within al-Abadi’s own parliamentary 
bloc (State of Law). Several ministries, including the 
Interior, are still controlled by the powerful Shia militias 
loyal to Iran. 
Exernal Actors and Regime Support8
The war against ISIS is at the forefront of the common 
Western, mainly US and EU, agenda in Iraq. A further 
priority, especially for the EU, is to hinder state collapse 
and continued migration of the IDPs to Europe; work 
is therefore centered on preparing for early return and 
recovery. Other external interests include geopolitical 
considerations: the wish to contain Iranian influence and 
to maintain good relations with both Kurdish stakeholders 
and Turkey. Conversely, Haydar al-Abadi’s government is 
8. This section is based on Morten Bøås, Stein Sundstøl 
Eriksen, Tine Gade et al. 2017.
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recognised by the West and Iran as the best alternative in 
Iraq (although the two disagree on how the government 
should relate to Iranian-sponsored militias). 
The US and the EU are key donors in Iraq, with 
involvement in humanitarian aid; stabilisation– 
and recovery programmes; political dialogue and 
reconciliation; economic development; state building and 
capacity building.9 Although the material support they 
provide could have implied leverage, Western donors 
have not put real pressure on the Iraqi government, with 
the exception of the issue of counter-terrorism and the 
pressure on Nouri al-Maliki to resign in 2014; but this 
meddling in Iraqi affairs was only pursued because it 
was considered vital to defeating ISIS. Since then, many 
international stakeholders have feared and still fear 
that they might push al-Abadi towards Tehran if they 
voice explicit criticism. Western states see al-Abadi’s 
government as a necessary carrier of local ownership 
of Iraq’s domestic reform and as an interlocutor for 
stabilisation and local efforts in the war against terrorism, 
and see few alternatives. Thus, Western donors do not 
push Iraq towards security sector reform, prioritising 
short term gains against ISIS over the long-term structural 
gains of the Iraqi state. Indeed, given the weakness of the 
Iraqi army and security forces, having the PMF and allied 
Iraqi decision makers onboard are key to defeating ISIS.
The World Bank Group is an allied partner to Western 
policies in Iraq. The World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) returned to Iraq in 2003 following 
the US-led invasion, after a 30-year absence; their level of 
commitment speeded up considerably after the rise of ISIS. 
The World Bank signed three new projects in December 
2015 and December 2016, which led to the disbursement 
of 1,2 and 1,444 billion USD, in order to address Iraq’s 
external financing needs. The IMF’s commitment to Iraq 
also strongly increased in the same period: Iraq received 
9. The US has contributed with 75% of the military funds 
for the global coalition against ISIS (at least 5,000 US 
troops are deployed in Iraq), including training of 
Iraqi military personnel, weapons sales, air support 
and intelligence sharing. The UN and the EU are the 
key political- and humanitarian actors, often with the 
UNDP as implementing partner. A small UN operation, 
the UNAMI, has been renewed yearly since 2003 and is 
grounded in UNSCRES 1770. It is constituted by around 
350 mainly Fijian and Nepalese peacekeepers. The UN 
Special Representative for Iraq is also the head of the 
UNAMI mission. 
1.2 billion USD emergency financing in July 2015 under 
the Rapid Financing Instrument, in a Fund decision that 
made reference to ISIS. In July 2016, the IMF authorised 
a Stand-By Agreement and a loan of a total value of 5.34 
billion USD to be paid over three years. The aim of this 
package was to address the double shock faced by low oil 
prices and growing security challenges. This money went 
directly into the government’s budget, strengthening 
Haydar al-Abadi’s position and the government’s 
ability to provide services. The aid package, which was 
essential to enable Iraq to effectively resist ISIS, comes 
as an illustration of the tight links between international 
financial institutions and the political interests of key 
global powers.
‘Governance’ is one of three pillars of the World Bank 
Country Partnership Strategy, but this amounts to 
economic governance (public and private sector) alone 
(World Bank 2015). In the mentioning of ISIS, the latter is 
described as a phenomenon external to the Iraqi political 
system. The World Bank’s praise of al-Abadi’s political 
reform efforts (World Bank 2015) seem, on the other 
hand, somewhat exaggerated. Many Iraqi civilians see 
the so-called political process as a pure fiction (al-Rashid 
2016), and, if anything, as an embodiment of the rampant 
corruption in Iraq since 2003. Popular criticisms of the 
government extend to the foreign, Western supporters of 
the Iraqi state. 
The EU has not, thus far, been adept at publicising its 
considerable humanitarian efforts, and has therefore not 
harvested the soft power gains it could have hoped for. 
The solution has been to work with al-Abadi and the 
technocrats in his government and potentially undermine 
Iranian-backed or other actors who oppose the reform 
agenda. Since 2011, Western donors have primarily used 
the strategy of ‘national dialogue’ to address internal 
conflict and governance issues. Western powers do not 
enforce solutions. The EU believes that Iraqis must solve 
their internal issues themselves, and that external actors 
should intervene as facilitators only once this is secured. 
Additionally, capacity building, conceptualised as part of 
economic development assistance, is provided.
Although there has been a trend over the last ten years 
to support the regime directly through budget funding 
(IMF and World Bank) and through limiting explicit 
criticism of governments that could have consequences 
for the country’s stability and investment risk rating, 
this coincides with initiatives to empower the (secular) 
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opposition. Western donors are dependent on the 
regime of the country they support as the bearer of local 
ownership and as the interlocutor for governance and 
stabilisation, but at the same time this does not hinder 
them from also supporting what they see as desirable 
alternatives to the regime.
The general question of supporting regimes with track 
records of human rights violations is also pragmatic 
and strategic. It could be argued that a war against 
terrorism would be more successful if the root causes 
of radicalisation, including perceptions of regime 
brutality (and the brutality of affiliated Shia militias) 
were addressed more efficiently. Taking the opposite 
view, however, other scholars have also shown that 
grievances in the broader population are less central to 
explaining the onset and duration of civil war than the 
existence of in-group policing mechanisms to control 
potential spoilers (see Fearon 2011). While addressing 
the concerns of the Sunni Arab population is a sine qua 
non for defeating ISIS, the answer probably lies more in 
power sharing mechanisms than simply in improving the 
rule of law.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
As a result of  the weakened popularity of ISIS in Iraq, 
for reasons related to its own failure of governance (and 
unrelated to external donors), there is currently an 
opportunity in Iraq to re-establish the bases of the Iraqi 
state, and Iraqi nationalism, in remote and deprived areas, 
as well as in areas with strong regional patriotism, such 
as in Mosul. This moment could and should be exploited 
further by local, federal and international stakeholders 
alike, so as to promote genuine state building in Iraq and 
hinder new forms of radicalisation in the future. The lack 
of a political plan for the post-ISIS governance of Mosul 
and the larger Nineveh province is of great concern. To 
seize the extraordinary opportunity presented by the 
weakening support for radical groups, Sunni leaders from 
Mosul should put petty conflicts aside for the greater 
good of the city, and the international community should 
expand partnerships with a variety of local and regional 
stakeholders, so as to improve outreach and promote 
inclusiveness in all areas of Iraq.
The impending defeat of ISIS in Mosul will not mean 
the end to ISIS as an ideology. The Jihadi group will lose 
its proto-state and go back to being a classical terrorist 
organization, with the possibility of cells hidden in 
the desert near Mosul and elsewhere (although the 
international coalition seeks to destroy these). Thus, 
ISIS must be fought at the doctrinal and ideological 
level, and Sunnis alone can do this. It is urgent that 
the ideological and political battle begins, to seize the 
historical opportunity created by Sunni anger against 
ISIS rule (al-Amin 2017). It is of tantamount importance 
that the international coalition, the peshmerga as well as 
the Iraqi army and allied militias attempt to minimise 
civilian casualties from land and air strikes, and avoid 
attempting to speed up the battle (see ICG 22 March 
2017). The mistakes committed during the liberation of 
Tikrit and Fallujah – the scenes of massive destructions 
–, must be avoided at all costs.10 The Shia groups that are 
part of the Popular Mobilisation Forces and the Kurdish 
peshmerga must stick to their promise not to enter the 
city of Mosul, as this would only create new grievances 
in the local population. Youths in Nineveh must be given 
alternatives and job opportunities, in order to avoid 
poor governance and the power vacuum in the wake 
of the liberation giving rise to new radicalism. The root 
causes that led to the rise of ISIS in the first place must 
be addressed immediately. Mosul’s infrastructure must 
be rebuilt, and its civil servants, who have not been paid 
for years, compensated. The hundreds of thousands of 
IDPs must be given a package that can help them return. 
The competing Sunni politicians in Mosul must prioritise 
long-term collective gains for their city rather than petty 
power struggles, and seize the historical opportunity 
to forge a future for their city and Sunnis in Iraq. More 
generally, the efforts at security sector reform must be 
more genuine, and the international donor community 
should precondition needed aid packages on real reforms. 
Moreover, the question of decentralisation, and possibly, 
the creation of new federal regions, on the model of the 
Kurdish one, needs discussion (O’Driscoll 2016). The 
solution that can include and represent Sunni Arabs best 
should be adopted. Although competing groups should 
also be listened to, they should not be able to prevent the 
carving out of a future for Iraq.
10. Amnesty International (2016) is among the organisations 
having documented the abuses, on all sides, during the 
liberation of various Sunni areas, including Tikrit from 
ISIS. 
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Iraqi actors involved in the Mosul battle:
Iraqi army, special operations forces, counter-terrorism forces
Kurdish peshmerga associated with the ruling Kurdish Democratic party in Erbil (Masoud Barzani)
Kurdish peshmerga associated with the Suleimania-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Jalal Talabani) 
Various militias part of the Popular Mobilisation Forces umbrella. Most of the Shia militias, but not all, are very close to Tehran.
The Popular mobilisation forces also include Sunni, Christian and Yazidi armed bands. The main Sunni group, the Nineveh 
guards, is led by politician and former governor Athil al-Nujaifi.
International military actors involved in the Mosul battle:
The International Coalition against ISIS. Of the around 30 participating states, the US is the most involved (with around 4,000 
men), and secondly, France.
Italy is not part of the international Coalition but its carabinieri have trained the Iraqi special forces
Around 850 Turkish troops based near Bashiqa, Nineveh.
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